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Abstract
Using individual firm data, this study analyzes the credit channel in Austria. The
estimation is based on an accelerator specification of investment demand augmented by
the liquidity ratio and a firm specific user cost of capital. The results show that there is a
credit channel in Austria affecting all firms, while the interest rate channel is significant as
long as the liquidity ratio is not included in the regression. Taking into account trade credit
or lending relationships increases the significance but not necessarily the size of the
interest rate channel. The interest rate channel is not significant for young firms due
mainly to the fact that young firms rely more heavily on sales to increase investment. In
general it is found that firms can reduce the sensitivity of investment to their liquidity
position by building lending relationships with a housebank or using trade credit as a
substitute for bank loans.
JEL Classification: C23, D92, E22, E52, G31, G32
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Non-technical Summary
The credit channel view of the transmission mechanism is based on the idea that the
investment decision of the firm is not independent from its financing decision because
external and internal funds are not perfect substitutes. Thus, due to capital market
imperfections, the supply and the cost of external funds a firm faces will depend not only
on the monetary stance but also on its financial structure and other individual
characteristics that determine its access to financial markets. Under this view, the effect of
a monetary tightening will be smaller for firms which are able to substitute bank lending
with other types of external funds or for firms for which asymmetric information issues
are of less relevance. If firms are able to circumvent a credit squeeze through other forms
of financing or if banks do not reduce their supply of loans even when the monetary stance
changes, then the credit channel will be weaker.
This study attempts to find evidence of a credit channel using a data set of Austrian
firms. The approach followed here is to incorporate a firm specific user cost of capital that
allows to directly measure the effects of monetary policy. In order to account for the
financial position of the firm, the investment demand equation is augmented by the
liquidity ratio, which is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to the capital stock. To test for
the distributional effects of monetary policy, variables that account for the firm￿s access to
the capital market are interacted with determinants of investment.
Since Austria has long pursued a hard currency regime the money view and the interest
rate channel have not played an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. The most important determinants of investment spending have included sales and
earnings expectations as well as the existing capital stock and its utilization. While the
issuance of equities and bonds has played a minor role in the external financing of firms,
lending from other firms or building lending relationships with a house bank have been
the dominant financing strategies. Therefore, the focus of this study lies on the role of
trade credit and lending relationships for the monetary transmission mechanism in Austria.
Instead of splitting the sample according to certain criteria, variables that account for
the access of the firm to the capital markets are interacted with the determinants of
investment. In this way, the effect of sales, the user cost of capital and the liquidity ratio
on investment are made conditional on the firm￿s access to financial markets or its ability
to substitute loans with other type of external funds.
The empirical analysis relies on data from balance sheets and income statements of
Austrian firms collected by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank in the course of her
refinancing activities. In addition to the balance sheet data, the OeNB collects monthly
data from banks that give credit of more than ATS 5 million to firms. By using thisECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 6
database, which is available only after 1994, it becomes possible to construct proxies for
the existence of a house bank. Given the large number of banks per inhabitant in Austria
and the rather strong competition in this sector, a high share of loans from a single bank in
total banks loans is taken as an indicator of a close lending relationship. The variable used
to investigate the relevance of trade credit for investment is the share of trade credit in
short-term debt.
The results for the period 1994 to 1999 tend to confirm the existence of a credit
channel in Austria. Financial variables are significant determinants of investment demand
and considerable differences exist in the investment behavior across groups of firms.
Contrary to what has been suggested before, growth of sales contributes to explain
investment behavior as long as no financial variables are taken into account. Young firms
are more dependent on sales than other types of firms. This may be the result of the larger
informational asymmetries that young firms face.
As in the case of sales, the effect of the user cost of capital on investment diminishes
with the presence of financial variables. However, it is found that the effect and
significance of the user cost of capital on investment does not necessarily decrease with
size or age. As before, this is not the case when variables that should be expected to
dampen the interest rate channel, such as the share of trade credit or the existence of a
house bank, are included in the regression.
The liquidity ratio seems to be the most important determinant of investment demand
in Austria. It is almost always significant and the size of the effect is also much larger than
the effect of all other variables. However, the total effect is conditional on other
characteristics of the firms. It is shown that firms may be able to diminish their
dependence on internal funds by using trade credit or having close relationships with a
house bank. Although these relationships seem to weaken the credit channel, they do not
necessarily weaken the interest rate channel when such a channel exists. This confirms the
view that trade credit and the house bank principle help overcome liquidity constraints but
do not dampen the effect of the interest rate on investment.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 7
1.  Introduction
The credit channel view of the transmission mechanism is based on the idea that the
investment decision of the firm is not independent from its financing decision because
external and internal funds are not perfect substitutes. In this view, there is a wedge
between the cost of external and internal funds, which arises due to imperfections in the
capital market, such as asymmetric information, agency costs or moral hazard.
Additionally, due to adverse selection firms may be rationed from credit no matter which
price they are willing to pay for external funds. Thus, if capital market imperfections exist,
the supply and the cost of external funds a firm faces will depend not only on the
monetary stance but also on its financial structure and other individual characteristics that
determine its access to financial markets, such as size, age, and an existing close
relationship to another firm or to a bank.
If a credit channel exists a tightening of monetary policy will have a larger effect on
financially constrained firms because their cost (quantity) of external funds will rise (fall)
more compared to the cost (quantity) of internal funds and compared to firms that are not
financially constrained.
1 This can happen either by affecting the supply of loans due to a
fall in deposits (bank lending view) or due to a fall in the net worth of the firm (balance
sheet view).
2 Under the balance sheet view, the effect of monetary policy is also exerted
by a decrease on the demand for funds due to the worsening of the firm￿s financial
position. Thus, according to the credit channel view of the transmission mechanism
monetary policy will not only have stronger real effects, but also distributional effects by
affecting firms￿ spending on investment.
3
Finding empirical evidence of a credit channel has usually been pursued in the context
of the financial accelerator framework. These studies have tested whether the investment
decision of financially constrained firms depends more strongly on the monetary policy
stance. Most of these studies used firm balance sheet data and split the sample by some a
priori criteria which reflect the firm￿s access to the capital market, such as size, age,
dividend payout ratio, coverage ratio, etc.
4
This study attempts to find evidence of a credit channel using a data set of Austrian
firms. Wesche (2000) used a similar data set to estimate an accelerator error correction
                                                          
1 When a firm with limited access to the capital market does not have enough internal funds to finance its
desired investment, this firm is said to be financially constrained.
2 For the bank lending channel to exist firms have to be bank dependent and monetary policy has to be capable
of changing the supply of loans. For the balance sheet channel to exist, the wedge between internal and
external funds has to be dependant on the net worth of the firm. See for example Bernanke et al. (1994)and
Kashyap et al. (1997)
3 The credit channel refers usually to both the balance sheet and the bank lending view. Although, they are two
distinct channels, in empirical work it is hard to distinguish among them.
4 For surveys see Hubbard (1994), and Mojon et al (2000).ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 8
model of investment to test for the existence of a credit channel in Austria; as in other
studies the interest rate was included as a proxy for the user cost of capital and its cross
variation was accounted for by dummies. The approach followed here is to incorporate a
firm specific user cost of capital that allows measuring the effect of monetary policy
directly.
5 The investment demand equation is also augmented by including variables such
as the liquidity ratio
6 to account for the financial position of the firm.
7 To test for the
distributional effects of monetary policy, variables that account for the firm￿s access to the
capital market are interacted with the determinants of investment. Due to the structure of
financial markets in Austria, the issuance of equities and bonds has played a minor role in
the external financing of firms. Instead relationships with other firms and the house bank
principle have been the dominant financing strategy. Therefore, the focus of this study lies
on the role of trade credit and lending relationships for the monetary transmission
mechanism in Austria.
8
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a short description of Austrian
investment spending and financing, followed by a description of the database and the
indicators used in the empirical part. Section 4 introduces and motivates the specification
used to find evidence for the existence of a credit channel with a firm specific user cost of
capital. Section 5 focuses on the role of trade credit and the house bank principle on the
transmission mechanism. Finally, some conclusions are drawn based on the empirical
findings.
2.  Investment Financing and Spending in Austria
Before entering the European Monetary Union Austria￿s monetary policy had followed
a fixed exchange rate regime since 1973: first the Schilling was fixed against a basket of
currencies and since 1981 against the German mark. Due to the stability of this peg
Austria was considered to form a de facto monetary union with Germany. For this reason,
the money view and the interest rate channel were not so important for the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in Austria; instead, the exchange rate channel together
with the cost of capital channel were considered more relevant.
9
                                                          
5 See Chirinko et al. (1999)
6 The liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to capital stock. Liquid assets includes, securities,
cash, and other liquid assets.
7 See Bernanke et al. (1994), Bond et al. (1994), Kaplan et al. (1995), Oliner et al. (1996),Bond et al. (1997),
Mairesse et al. (1999), Mojon et al. (2000), Vermeulen (2000), and Wesche (2000)
8 See Nilsen (1999), Kohler et al. (2000) and Marotta (2000) for studies relating trade credit and the
transmission mechanism and Petersen et al. (1994), Conigliani et al. (1997), Degryse et al. (1998), Elsas et al.
(1998), and Dell￿Ariccia et al. (2000) for the role of lending relationships.
9 Gl￿ck (1995)ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 9
This was reinforced by the policy of subsidizing credit. As of 1991, 47% of all bank
loans extended to the industry and 11% of bank credits to small firms were subsidized.
10
Thus, the existence of subsidized credit, which was used intensely up to the beginning of
the 1990￿s, had also dampening effects on the interest rate channel.
11
As a result, investment spending reacted very little to the interest rate and much more
to changes in the exchange rate.
12 The main influences on investment activity were sales
and earnings expectations as well as the existing capital stock and its utilization.
13 These
facts justify the estimation of an accelerator specification of investment demand
augmented by financial factors as it was done in Wesche (2000) and Gugler (1997).
Corporate finance in Austria has been characterized by the strong dependence of firms
on bank lending. Capital markets are narrow and underdeveloped and have been used
mostly by public authorities and financial institutions, while the issuance of debt by
private non-financial institutions has been negligible. Equity ownership is one of the
lowest in Europe, while the debt ratio of Austrian firms of around 75% on average is
relatively high compared to other European countries.
14 According to the sample of firms
from the OeNB database (see Table 1) the average debt ratio of Austrian firms in the
nineties was almost 80%. Due partly to the financial system, the universal banking
principle and the law which mainly protects creditors, the issuance of bond and
commercial paper by non-financial institutions in Austria has been very small.
15 The share
of bonds in GDP issued by non-financial corporations was only 2.8% in 1997, compared
to a share of 31% issued by credit institutions and 30% issued by the government.
16 The
main reasons for the low development of the capital markets are the predominance of
small and medium sized firms, a relatively strong but declining presence of the state and a
high concentration of ownership. This last point also reinforces the importance of bank
debt, since banks are both important direct and, through holdings, indirect owners of many
firms. 
17
Beside bank lending and other debt the most important item in the composition of
liabilities is trade credit. In 1999 this item amounted to 11% of total liabilities while
securities issuance was less than 1%. It is also worth mentioning that on the asset side
trade credit also amounts to an important share of the assets of non-financial institutions.
Moreover, the developments of trade credit and trade debt follow closely the evolution of
                                                          
10 Gnan (1995)
11 Subsidized credits are still existent in Austria but their significance is very small.
12 Gnan (1995)
13 For more details on institutional features and empirical data on all the above points see Pech (1994).
14 Gnan (1995), Quehenberger (1997) and IMF (1998)
15 Delbreil et al. (2000)
16 See Table 2, Ehrmann et al (2001).
17 Gugler (1997)ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 10
inventories on the balance sheet of non-financial corporations. Given the importance of
inventories on total investment, trade debt seems to be an important source of investment
financing for Austrian firms.
At the same time, the banking sector is one of the most overbanked in Europe,
18
characterized by too many banks and a very low degree of concentration. There are 123
banks per million inhabitants in Austria, compared to 45 in Germany and 25 in France,
19
while the largest 5 banks account for less than 50% of the market.
20 Like in Germany bank
relationships have been characterized by the presence of a ￿house-bank￿.
21 Although
difficult to verify in empirical work, the practice of long-standing loyalty to one bank
prevails in Austria and has often been held responsible for the absence of a credit channel.
The foundations of this relationship lie in the specific banking practices (similar to those
in Germany) that are governed by commercial law that systematically protects creditors.
22
3.  Database and indicators
The Oesterreichische Nationalbank regularly collects data on balance sheets and
income statements of Austrian firms in the course of her refinancing activities. To check
the solvency of non-financial enterprises involved in the collateralization of monetary
policy operations, the OeNB requests annual accounts. These annual accounts are
submitted to the OeNB￿s by the enterprises themselves or by commercial banks doing
business with the enterprises in question. Consolidated financial statements are collected
only in exceptional cases.
 23
The database contains annual data for the years 1979 to 1999 which provide a total of
42,870 observations. Although after 1987 the annual samples contain more than 2,000
firms, the time series dimension is comparatively small for most firms: only 88 firms are
observed over the whole sample period and 3,959 firms appear in the data only once.
In addition to the balance sheet data, the OeNB collects monthly data from banks that
give credit of more than ATS 5 million to firms. Using this database, which is available
only after 1994, it becomes possible to construct proxies for the existence of a house bank.
The OeNB database cannot be considered a statistical sample and is biased, too.
Commercial banks usually present collateral from companies which they expect will
satisfy the OeNB￿s solvency requirements. Sound enterprises are thus over-represented in
                                                          
18 See Kaufmann (2001) for a description of the Austrian banking system.
19 See Table 2, Ehrmann et al (2001).
20 IMF (1998)
21 Delbreil et al. (2000)
22 Ibid.
23 The individual data are strictly confidential and have to be aggregated for any publication in order to
comply with data secrecy legislation.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 11
the sample. The bias becomes more severe when only those firms for which longer time
series exist are included, since these are mostly large firms.
After observations with negative values of sales, total assets, the stock of capital, total
debt, number of employees as well as outliers of investment ratio, net sales, growth of net
sales, user cost of capital and liquidity ratio
24 were removed, a sample of firms present in
the sample during at least five consecutive years was selected; thus, only 4,158
observations remain in the sample for the period 1994 to 1999.
The variable used to investigate the relevance of trade credit for investment is the share
of trade credit in short-term debt. Since trade credit is often related to the financing of
inventories it is usually extended for short periods.
The existence of a house bank has usually been measured by the duration of the
lending relationship.
25 However, due to the short time span of this database it was not
feasible to construct such an indicator. On the other hand, given the large number of banks
per inhabitant in Austria and the rather strong competition in this sector, a high share of
loans from a single bank in total loans from banks could be taken as an indicator of a close
lending relationship. Since lending relationships usually exist to provide short-term
liquidity, the distinction according to debt maturity was made to better distinguish
between the effects of lending relationships on financing investment and their effects on
helping firms overcome short-term liquidity restrictions. Therefore, four different
indicators are used to account for the presence of a ￿Hausbank￿: 1) the number of banks
with which a firm has business relationships 2) the share of loans from the bank with the
largest percentage of loans on total bank loans 3) the share of short term loans from the
bank with the largest percentage on short bank loans and 4) the share of long term loans
from the bank with the largest percentage on long term bank loans. Thus, the first
indicator shows the largest concentration of loans from one single bank on the total of
loans from banks while the other two show the same ratio according to the maturity of the
loans.
Table 2 presents the statistics of the sample used in this study. These statistics are
presented not only for the full sample but also for groups of firms according to size and
age.
26 As seen in the table small and young firms represent each only 17% and 12% of the
                                                          
24 It was done by excluding data which exceeded 5 times the interval between quartiles from the median.
25 Petersen et al. (1994), Conigliani et al. (1997), Degryse et al. (1998), Elsas et al. (1998), and Dell￿Ariccia et
al. (2000)
26 In Valderrama (2001) it is shown that no significant differences in the elasticity of the user cost of capital
are observed for small firms defined as firms with less than 55 employees or 148 employees. However, in
terms of the effects of financial variables on investment, firms with more than 55 employees do not behave as
financially constrained. Therefore, the definition of small firms was taken to be firms with less than 55
employees. A similar argument applies to the age criteria. Firms which have been established in the last 10
years are considered young firms.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 12
observations, respectively. Some interesting patterns emerge from these tables. First, the
average investment ratio of small firms of 7.2% is much lower than that of the full sample
and of all other groups, which show an average investment ratio between 9.8% and 10.6%.
The average growth in sales of small firms is also significantly smaller than that of the
other groups, whereas young firms are the fastest growing group and also have the highest
investment ratio.
The liquidity ratio is more or less uniform across groups except again for small firms,
which in average keep 52% of their capital in the form of liquid assets. Small firms also
tend to have a larger share of trade credit in short-term debt than the rest of the sample.
Due to the low number of banking relationships of small firms, these firms also show the
largest concentration of loans from the bank with the largest share in total debt no matter
for which maturity.
Since the user cost of capital depends on the interest rate, a natural way of testing the
effect of monetary policy on investment is measuring the sensitivity of investment to the
user cost of capital. Past studies have used the market interest rate as a proxy for the user
cost of capital and the variation across firms has been modeled with dummies. This is
circumvented here by including a firm-specific user cost of capital defined as:
27






























Where,  it r is the apparent interest rate, which is defined as the ratio of interest and
similar charges to gross debt it B , and 
I
t p  is the economy wide price deflator for gross
investment,  t P  is the GDP deflator, itc is the investment tax credit, τ is the corporate tax
rate,  i b is the debt ratio of the firm and  i roe  is the return on equity.
28 This definition of
the user cost of capital is a weighted average user cost of capital that takes into account
first the financial structure of the firm
29 and thus reflects the fact that the cost of capital
may increase with the leverage of the firm, and second the effect of the tax system on
investment. It includes three additive elements: the opportunity cost of capital given by the




t p p 1 + ∆  and the economic depreciation δ .
30 As seen in table 2, the variation of these
measures of user cost across firms is much smaller than the variation observed in other
variables. However, on average, young and small firms tend to face a slightly higher user
cost of capital.
                                                          
27 See Chirinko (1993 and 1999) for similar studies.
28 This definition is labeled ￿WACC with taxes￿ in Graph 1
29 In cases when the debt ratio was more than 100%, this was set to 100%.
30 See Appendix for the values used.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 13
4.  Model and Estimation
In a world of perfect capital markets the investment decision of a firm would be
independent of its financing decision.
31 However, in a world with asymmetric information,
moral hazard, agency costs, adverse selection and other market imperfections, internal and
external funds will not be perfect substitutes. Since monetary policy affects the cost and
availability of funds, the analysis of the transmission mechanism at the firm level is done
by testing whether monetary policy affects a firm￿s investment spending.
In order to find empirical evidence for the existence of a credit channel, a number of
studies have tested whether the demand for investment of firms which are considered
financially constrained depends more strongly on the monetary policy stance.
32 The
starting point is an investment demand specification derived from the optimization
problem of the firm. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function the desired capital
stock of firm i at time t, 
*
it K , will be given by the first-order conditions for profit-
maximizing behavior, which states that the marginal productivity of capital should be










Where  it S  is output or net sales,  it UC  is the user cost of capital and  i α the share of
capital in the production function. For a constant elasticity of substitution production
function, the computation of the marginal productivity leads to elasticities of sales and
user cost with respect to capital, which are generally different from unity in absolute
value. In this case, taking logs and writing the logarithms of 
*
it K
34 and  it S
35 with small
letters, usingρ for the log of the user cost of capital leads to:
it it i it s k γρ β α − + =
*
(3)
The parameter γ  is the constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
The accelerator specification for investment demand is obtained by taking first
differences and using the following expression as an approximation for investment
δ − ≈ ∆ − 1 ,t i it it K I k  (with I and δ  denoting investment and depreciation, respectively).
Since the adjustment to the desired capital stock is not instantaneous, this equation is
                                                          
31 That is, if the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds.
32 For literature surveys see Hubbard (1994), Mojon et al. (2000).
33 For detailed derivations of the profit maximizing behavior see for example Bond et al (1997) and Mairesse
et al (1999).
34 The stock of capital: was calculated using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 10%.
35 Output is defined as net sales.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 14
generally expressed as an auto-regressive distributed lag specification, where  i η  denotes a
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Due to asymmetric information and agency costs the lender will charge a higher
premium to firms on which he/she has less information. This premium will be lower the
larger the net worth of the firm which can be used as collateral. Due to moral hazard, if the
firm is highly indebted the lender will raise the external finance premium. These
imperfections and the fact that firms will cut their investment plans when an increase in
the real interest rate leads to a deterioration of their financial position, give rise to the
balance sheet channel. Under this view of the transmission mechanism the cost of external
funds will depend on the financial structure of the firm and the demand for investment
will depend on the financial position of the firm. Therefore, the empirical estimation of the
credit channel has often been based on the financial accelerator theory of investment,
which states that weak balance sheets can amplify adverse shocks on firm investment.
In this framework the investment demand equation in (4) is augmented by factors that
account for the net worth of the firm or the availability of internal funds measured by the
ratio of liquid assets to capital, which is a liquidity ratio. Thus, the augmented investment
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Here  it LA represents liquid assets
36, and 
I
it p  is the economy-wide price of investment.
The hypothesis is that if a credit channel exists, financial variables not only will be
significant but their presence will change the total effect of the user cost of capital on
investment demand.
The estimation of the investment demand was done using two-step Arellano-Bond-
GMM-type estimators, which control for biases due to unobserved firm-specific effects
and the lagged endogenous variables.
37 The estimations were carried out using first
differences to remove the firm specific effects and time dummies were included to control
for exogenous shocks in the data. Several estimations, which are not presented here, were
carried out to determine the number of lags of the variables. All lagged levels of the
                                                          
36 The ratio to the capital stock is used to avoid unit problems.
37 Arellano and Bond (1991)ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 15
investment ratio and the predetermined variables are used as instrumental variables.
38 The
validity of the instruments was tested with a Sargan-test of over-identifying restrictions
and tests of serial correlation in the residuals. Additionally, the sample was split according
to size and age, which are usually used to take into account information asymmetries.
39
The results of the estimation of equation (4) are shown in table 3. Three different
estimations were performed: first on the full sample, second on the full sample with
dummies on all right hand side variables indicating small firms and third on the full
sample with dummies on all right hand side variables indicating young firms. The Sargan
test does not reject all three estimations and there is no evidence of second order serial
correlation.
The results of estimating equation (4) for the full sample confirm the perception that
growth of sales is the most important determinant of investment while the interest rate
channel is not significant. The point estimate of the long run elasticity of sales is 26.6%
and is significant at the 1% level. The point estimate for the long run user cost elasticity is
￿13.9% but is not significant. However, when allowing different coefficient estimates for
small and young firms these results change. In fact, for large, small and old firms, the user
cost of capital is significant, whereas the growth of sales is not a significant determinant of
investment of small firms. As expected, the long run elasticity of growth sales of 29.8% is
higher for younger firms compared to the whole sample and to 19.1% for old firms. The
sensitivity of investment demand to the user cost of capital is also as expected higher for
small firms (-15.6%) than for the full sample (-13.9%). However, it is observed that the
sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital is much larger for large (-21.9%) and
old firms (-33.3%), while there is a positive effect on the investment of young firms
coming from the interest rate channel.
This puzzle could be due to a misspecified equation or omitted variables. Table 4
shows the results of estimating an equation with the liquidity ratio as in equation 5.
40 As it
is often found in similar studies, growth of sales loses its significance in the presence of
the liquidity ratio. In the same way, the user cost of capital is never significant except for
young firms. However, for young firms the user cost of capital has a positive effect on
investment demand. The largest long run elasticity of the liquidity ratio is observed for
young firms (30.8%), while the lowest long run elasticity is found for small firms (12.2%).
                                                          
38 Tests not shown here were also done with different lags. The results, however, do not change significantly
with different number of lags on the instrument matrix.
39 See Wesche (2000) for the role of size and Valderrama (2001) for the role of size and age on the credit
channel in Austria.
40 Because lagged growth of sales was often not significant and negative, these variable was
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From these results it can be concluded that the financial position of the firm and the
growth of sales seem to play an important role in the determination of investment, in
particular for young firms, but much less for small firms. This result can be expected since
young firms will grow faster and will have more asymmetric informational problems,
which makes them more dependant on their own funds and future growth expectations.
Some of these results are, however, counterintuitive. In particular, the fact that the user
cost of capital is often not significant, or even positive. This could be an indication that,
possibly due to the existence of capital market imperfections, the traditional neoclassical
investment demand equation with or without the liquidity ratio does not adequately reflect
investment behavior in Austria. A factor that may be important and that has not been
investigated before is the degree of access to external funds or the ability to substitute
bank loans with other type of external funds. This is usually in inverse relation to the
degree of information a lender has on a borrower. Therefore, the next section concentrates
on the role of trade credit and lending relationships in overcoming information
asymmetries in Austria.
5.  Role of Trade Credit and Lending Relationships
In the credit channel view, firms which are more bank dependent will be more affected
by the monetary stance. In order to analyze the distributional effects of the transmission
mechanism, it is necessary to take into account features specific to the firm, which may
aggravate or dampen asymmetric information, agency costs and moral hazard. Due to the
characteristics of investment spending and financing in Austria, two factors that are
considered important for the transmission mechanism are analyzed: the existence of a
higher share of trade credit and the existence of a house bank.
In general the effect of a monetary tightening will be smaller for firms which are able
to substitute bank lending by other type of external funds or for firms for which
asymmetric information issues are of less relevance. If firms are able to circumvent a
credit squeeze through other forms of financing or if banks do not reduce their supply of
loans even when the monetary stance changes, then the credit channel will be weaker.
Cases in which this may happen include, for example, firms that are able to overcome a
shortage of bank financing by increasing debt with a partner firm or firms that establish
long term lending relationships with a bank which in return will not reduce credit during
recession or periods of tight monetary policy. Thus, the degree at which firms can
overcome informational asymmetries will determine whether a monetary tightening will
leave them financially constrained or not.
Instead of splitting the sample according to certain criteria, variables that account for
the access of the firm to the capital markets are interacted with the determinants ofECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 17
investment. In this way, the effect of sales, the user cost of capital and the liquidity ratio
on investment are made conditional on the firm￿s access to financial markets or its ability
to substitute loans with other type of external funds. The equation that will be estimated
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it IT  represents an interaction term that takes into account the firm￿s access to
the capital market. The variables studied here are: share of trade credit as a percentage of
short-term liabilities and four variables that measure the existence of a ￿Hausbank￿. Under
the hypothesis of a credit channel, the effect of these variables on investment should be
larger for those firms which have more restricted access to external funds. Since the
measures used here actually show whether firms may overcome informational
asymmetries and therefore have more access to the capital, the estimated elasticities
should be lower than in the case when these variables are omitted.
41
5.1. Trade Credit
The credit channel relies on firms being dependent on bank loans to finance their
investment. The issuance of commercial papers or bonds or the access to trade credit may
help firms overcome bank lending shortages. Since other forms of financing in the capital
markets such as shares and bonds are used very little in Austria, another alternative source
of finance that could indicate a lower degree of bank dependency would be the share of
trade credit as a percentage of short term debt.
The demand for trade credit has been explained by the transaction motive and the
finance motive. Although both are not exclusive, the interest lies here in the finance
motive. The hypothesis is that in the presence of credit market imperfections, when a bank
reduces its supply of loans, firms may use trade credit to overcome liquidity shortages.
The advantage of trade credit over bank credit is that the supplier will have more
information about the firm and will also have an advantage in terms of the collateral.
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Trade credit can be obtained either through an agreement with the supplier firm or just by
deferring payments.
42 Thus, in this section the following hypothesis is tested:
H1: investment demand of firms with higher share of trade credit in short-term debt
is less sensitive to their liquidity ratio.
To test this hypothesis, a variable that indicates the share of trade credit in short-term
debt is used. As before, additional estimations are done in order to make a distinction
according to size and age of the firm, since small firms will more likely be rationed by
banks and therefore will have to search for alternative ways of financing. In addition it has
been argued that in recessions or during credit squeezes large firms which obtain credit
more easily from financial or capital markets may be more willing to extend trade credit to
small firms. At the same time, large firms will be less required to use trade credit since
they will very likely be able to get cheaper credit from banks. Thus, trade credit will very
likely be more important for small or young firms.
As seen in table 5, the share of trade credit in short-term debt is significant for the full
sample. This, however, does not contribute to increase the significance of the user cost of
capital nor growth of sales on the demand equation for the whole sample. In general,
interacting trade credit in the regression reduces the long run elasticity of the liquidity
ratio. This effect is, as expected, especially important for young (16.7%) and small firms
(4.5%).
However, as shown in table 10, (where the long run elasticities are evaluated at
different values of the interaction term: the lowest possible value, the mean and the largest
possible value), it can be seen that, contrary, to what would be expected, when the share of
trade credit in short term debt increases the sensitivity of investment to the liquidity ratio
increases for all groups of firms except for small firms. For the largest value of the
interaction term, the sensitivity of investment to the liquidity ratio is still lower than in the
case when this interaction term is not included.
This evidence suggests that trade credit may be important in overcoming informational
asymmetries. The largest change is seen on the investment demand of small firms, which
are able to be less dependent on internal funds. The long run elasticity of the liquidity ratio
for small firms goes from 12.2% in equation 5 to 4.5% in equation 6. Thus, small firms
which are able to have a higher share of trade credit in short term debt, seem to be less
affected by changes in their liquidity position. This supports the hypothesis that small
firms are able to overcome liquidity constraints by using trade credit.
Trade credit and the liquidity ratio contribute slightly to reduce the sensitivity of
investment of large and old firms to the user cost of capital. This could be due to the
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market power that large or old firms may have on their suppliers, from which they are able
to obtain less expensive external funds. The effect on young firms is mixed: while the long
run elasticities are lower than in the previous specification, the user cost of capital
continues exerting a positive effect on investment.
5.2. Lending Relationships
Although the existence of a house bank has been difficult to quantify, the practice of
long-standing loyalty to a bank prevails in Austria and has often been held responsible for
the absence of a credit channel in Austria.
43 The hypothesis is that firms which are able to
rely on a ￿house bank￿ will suffer less from liquidity shortages because the problem of
asymmetric information is overcome through a long-standing relationship.
44 However, it is
not yet settled whether the presence of a house bank will increase or decrease the effect of
the user cost of capital on investment.
Although it has been argued that the existence of a ￿house bank￿ may curtail the
existence of a credit channel because the house bank will not restrict credit in difficult
times, the effect on the elasticity of the user cost of capital is ambiguous. The existence of
long term lending relationships will guarantee that banks do not reduce the quantity of
loans to its clients during times of monetary tightening or recessions, but they may change
the price of loans, since banks will have a monopolistic power over their clients.
45 Thus,
the hypothesis tested here is:
H2: investment demand of firms which have a „house-bank“ is more sensitive to the
user cost of capital and less sensitive to the liquidity ratio.
Due to the difficulty to pin down the existence of a ￿house bank￿, the four indicators
outlined in section 3 are used to investigate the effect of lending relationships on
investment demand. As in the last section estimations are done not only for the full sample
but also for a split according to size and age.
1)  The number of banks with which a firm has business relationships (table 6):
This interaction term as well as growth of sales are significant only for old and young
firms (long run elasticity of growth of sales is 6.8% and 10.2%, respectively). The user
cost of capital is significant for both small (-6.3%) and young firms (+7.1%), but for
young firms the effect is still positive. As in the last two specifications the liquidity ratio is
always positive and significant. The effect of the financial position of the firms on
investment is, as expected, lower for all groups except for small firms (12.2% in table 4
and 13.9% in table 6).
                                                          
43 Quehenberger (1997), Delbreil et al. (2000).
44 Petersen et al. (1994).
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As seen in table 10 the sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital of small
firms decreases slightly when the number of banks becomes larger (6.5% for at the lowest
value and 6.1% at the highest value). This seems to suggest that by having multiple
lending relationships, small firms are able to ￿shop￿ for the best price. However, the
difference is very small and it is not validated for the other groups of firms. Thus,
evidence that having a house bank increases the sensitivity of investment to user cost of
capital based on this indicator of a house bank is not conclusive.
As a result of a larger number of banks the long run elasticity of the liquidity ratio
increases. This is in line with the idea that an exclusive lending relationship isolates firms
from restrictions stemming from a worsening financial position. However, there is no
evidence that banks use this exclusive lending relationship to increase the price of loans.
2)  The share of loans from the bank with the largest share in total loans from banks
(table 7):
Introducing this variable as an interaction term makes all variables in the investment
demand of small firms become significant. Growth of sales becomes also significant for
old (7.7%) firms, but is no longer significant for young firms.
The liquidity ratio is always significant and positive, except for the full sample.
Compared to the specification without an interaction term that proxy the influence of a
house bank relationship, the sensitivity to the liquidity ratio is much lower. For small
firms the interaction term is significant and positive (8.8%) and the size of the effect is as
large as the effect of the liquidity ratio on investment (8.4%). Taken together the effect on
investment is even larger than in the case when interaction term is not included in the
regression. For large firms, the effect of the liquidity ratio on the investment demand is
not affected by the inclusion of the share of loans coming from their main bank.
From table 10 it can be seen that the effect of the user cost of capital decreases for
small firms with the existence of a house bank and increases for all other groups. For all
groups of firms a high share of one bank in total bank loans reduces the sensitivity to the
availability of internal funds. This confirms the results obtained before.
3)  The share of long-term loans from the bank with the largest percentage in long-
term loans from banks (table 8):
All variables except the interaction term are significant and show the expected sign in
the regressions for large, old and small firms. On the other hand, the user cost of capital
and growth of sales lose their significance for young firms.
The effect of the user cost of capital on investment demand is much larger and
significant for small firms (-10.4%) compared to the one obtained (-7%) in the
specification without an interaction term (table 4). Surprisingly, compared to large firms (-
11.5%), this sensitivity is smaller. This suggests that when a higher concentration of longECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 21
term debt comes from a house bank the size of the firm does not help dampen the interest
rate channel.
The effect of the liquidity ratio is very similar for large (7.9%) and old firms (7.9%),
higher for small firms (13.1%) and very low for young firms (4.8%). Compared to the
estimation shown before, the sensitivity of investment demand to the liquidity ratio
decreases considerably by including this interaction term. This is the only specification in
which small firms are more sensitive to the availability of internal funds than large firms.
As seen in table 10, the effect of the liquidity ratio on investment becomes smaller with
a larger share of long-term loans from a single bank in the total of long-term bank loans.
The opposite effect can be observed with respect to the user cost of capital: the presence
of a house bank tends to increase the sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital.
Thus, as in the former case, this provides evidence that banks use the monopoly power
over their clients to increase the price of loans.
4)  The share of short-term loans from the bank with the largest percentage in short-
term loans from banks (table 9):
Including this indicator term does not change the significance of the determinants of
investment for the full sample, but the growth of sales becomes significant for small firms
(2.5%). As in the last part, the user cost of capital becomes significant for large (-10%)
and old firms (-13.3%), while the positive significant effect of this variable on the
investment of young firms (-0.2%) disappears. Compared to the last interaction term used,
the effect of the user cost of capital on investment decreases slightly for large firms and
increases for old firms. However, in both cases it increases as the share of loans from one
bank in total short-term loans increases (see table 10).
As before, the liquidity ratio remains positive and significant for all groups of firms.
However, the effect on investment is as large as it was when no interaction term was
included. The exception is the group of young firms. There are also rather large
differences in-between size and age groups. Compared to large firms (28.1%) the effect of
the liquidity ratio is much smaller for small firms (17.8%) and for young firms (12.4%)
compared to old firms (19.4%). Moreover, for all groups except old firms the size of the
effect becomes smaller as the interaction variable becomes larger (see table 10).
In summary, it is found here that the intensity and significance of both the interest rate
channel and the credit channel are conditional on whether the firm has a close lending
relationship with a bank or not. It can be concluded that an exclusive relationship with a
bank seems to help firms to be less dependant on their financial position but does not
isolate them from changes in the interest rate channel. The largest exception seems to be
the case of small firms for which a larger concentration of loans from one single bank on
bank loans decreases the effect of the interest rate channel on investment. The change onECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 22
the intensity of the interest rate channel is, however, very small. It is also found that these
results are very similar no matter which variable is used to account for a house bank.
6.  Summary and conclusions
Due to Austria￿s monetary policy and financial structure it is widely believed that the
effects of monetary policy through the credit channel are much more important than the
those predicted under the traditional monetary view. The investigation of the credit
channel with a sample of Austrian firms for the period 1994 to 1999 tends to confirm the
existence of a credit channel in Austria. Financial variables are significant determinants of
investment demand and considerable differences exist in the investment behavior across
groups of firms.
Contrary to what has been suggested before, growth of sales contributes to explain
investment behavior as long as no financial variables are taken into account. In general not
only the significance but also the long run elasticity of sales growth diminishes when
financial variables or an interaction term are included in the regression. There are also
considerable differences across groups of firms: young firms are more dependent on sales
than other groups of firms. This may be due to the larger informational asymmetries that
young firms face.
The interest rate channel is weak, but it does exist for some groups of firms. The size
and significance of the effect of the user cost of capital on investment depends not only on
the type of firm, but also on other variables included in the regression, which capture
informational asymmetries, access to capital and financial markets, etc. The direction of
the change, however, is not unique. As in the case of sales, the effect of the user cost of
capital on investment diminishes with the presence of financial variables. However, it is
found that the effect and significance of the user cost of capital on investment does not
necessarily decrease with size or age. This is not the case either when variables that should
be expected to dampen the interest rate channel, such as the share of trade credit or the
existence of a house bank, are included in the regression.
The liquidity ratio seems to be the most important determinant of investment demand
in Austria. It is almost always significant and the size of the effect is also much larger than
the effect of the other variables. However, the total effect is conditional on other
characteristics of the firms studied here. It is shown that firms may be able to diminish
their dependence on internal funds by using trade credit or having close relationships to a
house bank. Although these relationships seem to weaken the credit channel, they do not
necessarily weaken the interest rate channel when such a channel exists. This confirms the
view, that trade credit and the house bank principle help overcome liquidity constraints
but do not dampen the effect of the interest rate on investment.ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 23
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APPENDIX
Data Definitions
Investment: was defined as the reported increases by acquisition of tangible (fixed) assets.
The stock of capital: was calculated using the perpetual inventory method with a
depreciation rate of 10%.
Investment Ratio: Investment in year t divided by capital stock in year t-1.
Output: net sales
Gross Debt was defined as total liabilities ￿ equity ￿ capital like liabilities ￿ social capital
￿ long term reserves.
Liquidity ratio: is defined as liquid assets in year t to capital stock in year t-1
Trade Credit: trade debt + partner liabilities + deferred payments.
Corporate tax rate: the corporate tax rate is 34% since 1994
Investment tax credit:
Year Rate according to Law Rate used
1994 until March 31, 1994, the limit of the tax credit was
30%, afterwards the maximum rate was 15% for
machinery and equipment and 10% for vehicles.
15%
1995 between May 1, 1995 and May 31, 1996 the
maximum rate was set at 9% for machinery and




between June 1, 1996 and December 31, 1997 the
rate was set at 12% for new equipment and
machinery, 9% for used equipment and machinery




between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000
the maximum rate was set at 9% for machinery and












































6 Table 1. Financial Structure of Austrian Firms
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Asset structure (as % of total assets)
Total real fixed assets 34.56 34.87 33.18 32.59 34.96 32.24 32.08 37.89 42.28 42.89 36.60
Total financial fixed assets 1.40 1.51 2.90 3.54 3.81 4.54 6.03 8.29 7.40 7.48 8.76
Total inventories 25.33 24.91 23.01 25.30 22.50 22.67 25.65 19.82 17.11 15.17 18.08
Total trade credit 23.11 22.39 22.00 20.98 19.34 19.71 17.01 13.89 12.49 11.94 14.81
Total all other assets 15.60 16.32 18.91 17.59 19.40 20.85 19.23 20.12 20.73 22.52 21.75
Liability structure (as % of total liabilities)
Loans from credit institutions 40.90 41.44 28.05 36.18 38.05 34.75 30.48 23.41 23.04 23.59 23.96
Loans with maturity less than one year 25.53 25.43 18.71 26.29 22.10 19.87 20.05 14.87 15.54 14.82 16.32
Loans with maturity more than one year 15.37 16.01 9.33 9.89 15.95 14.88 10.43 8.54 7.51 8.77 7.64
Debt securities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.85 1.10 1.11 0.88
Trade debt 20.34 18.84 16.88 14.53 14.08 14.53 12.73 10.50 9.69 9.33 11.13
All other debt 22.43 22.18 32.24 23.08 14.00 20.83 24.39 20.58 21.54 21.18 19.43
Equity and reserves 12.09 12.54 16.55 17.26 16.46 18.65 18.96 27.59 28.76 30.67 28.98
All other liabilities 4.24 5.00 6.29 8.95 17.41 11.23 13.45 16.07 15.87 14.13 15.62
Flow indicators (as % of total assets)
Gross investment 2.87 3.86 4.31 4.34 10.59 9.71 9.02 9.52 7.09 8.24 10.04
Cash flow 12.75 12.91 11.69 10.60 12.04 11.47 10.78 9.44 9.31 10.18 11.27
Net operating profit 6.41 6.52 6.25 5.11 5.55 5.57 5.34 3.93 4.02 4.70 5.78
Interest and similar charges 3.84 4.37 4.07 3.80 4.16 3.37 2.87 2.09 1.89 1.77 1.52
Note: everything in percentages.
Source: Oesterreichische NationalbankECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 27











1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
short term interest rate long term interest rate
mean of WACC with taxes 25% percentile of WACC with taxes
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Table 2. Statistics
Group Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Number of employees (size)
all 4,158 320 517 1 4,948
small 701 31 15 1 54
large 3,457 379 549 55 4,948
young 496 337 443 3 2,913
old 3,662 318 526 1 4,948
Years since foundation (age)
all 4,158 28 22 2 136
small 701 25 20 2 94
large 3,457 28 22 2 136
young 496 6 2 2 8
old 3,662 31 21 9 136
Investment Ratio (in percentage)
all 4,158 9.93 9.06 0.00 58.13
small 701 7.23 8.91 0.02 58.13
large 3,457 10.48 9.00 0.00 58.06
young 496 10.61 9.94 0.01 55.39
old 3,662 9.84 8.93 0.00 58.13
Logarithm of net sales
all 4,158 12.80 1.27 9.18 17.62
small 701 11.44 0.81 9.18 14.82
large 3,457 13.08 1.17 10.47 17.62
young 496 13.06 1.18 10.05 15.74
old 3,662 12.77 1.28 9.18 17.62
Growth of net sales (in percentage)
all 4,158 3.22 14.49 -71.55 72.80
small 701 1.49 15.17 -67.89 63.61
large 3,457 3.57 14.32 -71.55 72.80
young 496 5.56 15.01 -54.15 72.80
old 3,662 2.91 14.39 -71.55 66.20
Debt ratio (in percentage)
all 4,158 70.76 20.83 8.44 184.35
small 701 74.02 24.89 9.87 179.30
large 3,457 70.10 19.84 8.44 184.35
young 496 71.74 19.97 15.15 143.89
old 3,662 70.63 20.94 8.44 184.35
Liquidity Ratio (in percentage)
all 4,158 48.40 32.95 0.15 215.63
small 701 52.02 33.95 0.15 200.94
large 3,457 47.67 32.70 0.74 215.63
young 496 45.34 30.30 2.46 203.11
old 3,662 48.82 33.28 0.15 215.63ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 29
Table 2. Statistics (continuation)
Group Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
User cost of capital with taxes (in percentage)
all 4,158 12.33 2.25 5.97 28.09
small 701 12.48 2.56 6.92 22.47
large 3,457 12.30 2.18 5.97 28.09
young 496 12.45 2.48 7.32 28.09
old 3,662 12.31 2.21 5.97 25.53
Trade credit share in short term debt (in percentage)
all 4,154 37.43 21.04 0.24 98.59
small 698 44.18 23.18 0.24 98.59
large 3,456 36.07 20.31 0.38 95.67
young 496 35.37 20.08 2.41 94.04
old 3,658 37.71 21.15 0.24 98.59
Number of Banks
all 3,758 4 4 1 79
small 545 2 1 1 7
large 3,213 4 4 1 79
young 460 4 3 1 23
old 3,298 4 4 1 79
Largest share of loans from one bank in total loans from banks (in percentage)
all 3,797 69.90 24.72 10.09 100.00
small 529 84.08 20.62 25.97 100.00
large 3,268 67.61 24.57 10.09 100.00
young 466 65.93 25.79 16.82 100.00
old 3,331 70.46 24.52 10.09 100.00
Largest share of long term loans from one bank in long term loans from banks (in %)
all 3,578 72.63 24.80 7.54 100.00
small 485 88.28 18.56 26.37 100.00
large 3,093 70.18 24.76 7.54 100.00
young 444 68.29 25.25 17.36 100.00
old 3,134 73.25 24.68 7.54 100.00
Largest share of short term loans from one bank in short term loans from banks (in %)
all 3,170 82.05 20.86 15.67 100.00
small 438 88.67 17.33 38.32 100.00
large 2,732 80.99 21.18 15.67 100.00
young 408 79.49 20.93 23.91 100.00
old 2,762 82.43 20.83 15.67 100.00ECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 30
Table 3
Neoclassical Investment Demand without the Liquidity Ratio (Equation 4)
GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all large old
It-1/Kt-2 0.130 0.034 0.183 0.043 0.121 0.033
Growth of Salest 0.192 0.089 0.161 0.070 0.124 0.082
Growth of Salest-1 0.039 0.016 0.041 0.014 0.043 0.016
Change in UCCt -0.102 0.114 -0.141 0.073 -0.234 0.082
Change in UCCt-1 -0.018 0.032 -0.038 0.023 -0.058 0.025
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.266 (0.017) 0.247 (0.010) 0.191 (0.066)
Change in User Cost -0.139 (0.394) -0.219 (0.050) -0.333 (0.004)
small young
It-1/Kt-2 -0.291 0.149 -0.001 0.116
Growth of Salest -0.111 0.115 0.170 0.128
Growth of Salest-1 -0.016 0.028 -0.076 0.036
Change in UCCt -0.003 0.036 0.215 0.054
Change in UCCt-1 0.009 0.023 0.119 0.031
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.068 (0.467) 0.298 (0.007)
Change in User Cost -0.156 (0.096) 0.047 (0.689)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.18 0.11
Change in User Cost 0.06 0.38
Number of obs. 2,652 2,652 2,652
Wald test 30.96 40.44 61.85
Sargan test 24.32 37.64 49.81
p-value 0.500 0.901 0.481
m1: -9.98 -9.66 -9.87
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 1.78 1.66 1.35
p-value 0.075 0.097 0.176
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 4
Neoclassical Investment Demand with the Liquidity Ratio (Equation 5)
GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all large old
It-1/Kt-2 0.057 0.041 0.101 0.044 0.076 0.042
Growth of Salest 0.014 0.070 0.018 0.056 0.038 0.054
Change in UCCt -0.018 0.096 -0.050 0.065 -0.016 0.063
Change in UCCt-1 -0.023 0.028 -0.035 0.022 -0.021 0.020
Liquidity Ratiot 0.202 0.097 0.202 0.065 0.146 0.053
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.067 0.057 0.026 0.046 0.060 0.036
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.015 (0.837) 0.020 (0.750) 0.041 (0.484)
Change in User Cost -0.044 (0.724) -0.094 (0.289) -0.040 (0.627)
Liquidity Ratio 0.285 (0.000) 0.254 (0.000) 0.224 (0.000)
small young
It-1/Kt-2 -0.220 0.133 -0.303 0.122
Growth of Salest -0.003 0.074 0.232 0.097
Change in UCCt -0.012 0.030 0.112 0.045
Change in UCCt-1 0.019 0.019 0.073 0.027
Liquidity Ratiot -0.144 0.069 0.001 0.060
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.053 0.045 0.170 0.057
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.013 (0.789) 0.219 (0.001)
Change in User Cost -0.070 (0.368) 0.122 (0.043)
Liquidity Ratio 0.122 (0.001) 0.308 (0.000)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.01 0.18
Change in User Cost 0.02 0.16
Liquidity Ratio -0.13 0.08
Number of obs. 2,652 2,652 2,652
Wald test 39.62 57.68 105.14
Sargan test 39.74 70.00 70.34
p-value 0.229 0.410 0.399
m1: -8.03 -8.90 -8.39
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 1.35 1.39 0.96
p-value 0.176 0.165 0.337
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 5
Investment Demand with Liquidity Ratio (Equation 6)
Interaction term: share of trade credit in short term debt
GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all Large old
It-1/Kt-2 -0.068 0.100 0.011 0.079 -0.034 0.077
Growth of Salest 0.076 0.068 -0.010 0.048 0.042 0.051
Change in UCCt 0.031 0.077 -0.097 0.048 -0.142 0.044
Change in UCCt-1 0.000 0.023 -0.034 0.021 -0.051 0.021
Liquidity Ratiot 0.097 0.067 -0.013 0.045 -0.005 0.025
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.037 0.041 -0.002 0.039 0.047 0.025
Interaction Term (IT) 0.171 0.096 -0.043 0.058 -0.011 0.039
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.219 0.256 0.168 0.186 0.237 0.181
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.062 0.176 0.155 0.126 -0.052 0.127
Change in UCCt*(IT) 0.083 0.072 0.072 0.076 0.218 0.062
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.048 0.039 0.035 0.043 0.064 0.039
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.072 0.129 0.239 0.107 0.101 0.053
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.124 0.048 0.204 0.058 0.136 0.036
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.053 (0.249) 0.052 (0.159) 0.024 (0.435)
Change in User Cost 0.081 (0.311) -0.098 (0.032) -0.093 (0.052)
Liquidity Ratio 0.156 (0.001) 0.163 (0.000) 0.138 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.160 (0.099) -0.044 (0.452) -0.011 (0.776)
Small young
It-1/Kt-2 -0.446 0.122 -0.413 0.137
Growth of Salest 0.040 0.073 0.301 0.076
Change in UCCt 0.094 0.056 0.242 0.068
Change in UCCt-1 0.011 0.034 0.110 0.037
Liquidity Ratiot 0.073 0.044 0.065 0.035
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.051 0.039 0.051 0.020
Interaction Term (IT) 0.073 0.051 0.008 0.032
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.478 0.285 0.185 0.357
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.236 0.168 -0.346 0.150
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.174 0.120 -0.388 0.145
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) -0.002 0.069 -0.053 0.080
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.320 0.107 -0.085 0.060
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) -0.184 0.058 0.002 0.045
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales -0.014 (0.501) 0.156 (0.000)
Change in User Cost -0.055 (0.158) 0.084 (0.011)
Liquidity Ratio 0.045 (0.032) 0.167 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.021 (0.477) -0.002 (0.943)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.066 0.132
Change in User Cost 0.043 0.177
Liquidity Ratio -0.118 0.030
Interaction Term (IT) 0.064 0.008
mean of (IT) 37.42% 44.18% 35.37%
Number of obs. 2,645 2,645 2,645
Wald test 65.64 288.36 608.24
Sargan test 69.92 131.43 149.49
p-value 0.704 0.906 0.588
m1: -8.68 -8.57 -8.64
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 0.81 0.78 0.63
p-value 0.420 0.434 0.531
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 6
Investment Demand with Liquidity Ratio (Equation 6)
Interaction term: log. of the number of banks with which a firm has business deals
GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all Large old
It-1/Kt-2 0.190 0.123 0.222 0.099 0.195 0.084
Growth of Salest 0.031 0.070 -0.063 0.056 0.022 0.046
Change in UCCt 0.078 0.065 -0.057 0.039 -0.033 0.037
Change in UCCt-1 0.008 0.023 -0.028 0.021 -0.001 0.018
Liquidity Ratiot 0.113 0.089 0.109 0.042 -0.038 0.036
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.023 0.049 0.001 0.049 0.083 0.031
Interaction Term (IT) -0.021 0.040 -0.014 0.019 -0.046 0.019
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) -0.155 0.104 -0.148 0.080 -0.147 0.071
Growth of Salest*(IT) 0.014 0.051 0.065 0.046 0.041 0.037
Change in UCCt*(IT) 0.009 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.000 0.016
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.014 -0.006 0.012
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) 0.001 0.050 0.020 0.032 0.059 0.029
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.023 0.026 0.047 0.027 0.017 0.019
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.048 (0.313) 0.006 (0.864) 0.068 (0.017)
Change in User Cost 0.101 (0.197) -0.072 (0.107) -0.042 (0.348)
Liquidity Ratio 0.165 (0.005) 0.192 (0.000) 0.130 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) -0.026 (0.593) -0.018 (0.448) -0.057 (0.010)
Small young
It-1/Kt-2 -0.474 0.129 -0.711 0.143
Growth of Salest 0.098 0.063 0.283 0.085
Change in UCCt -0.014 0.035 0.042 0.055
Change in UCCt-1 -0.005 0.023 0.060 0.037
Liquidity Ratiot -0.097 0.042 0.031 0.041
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.112 0.047 0.086 0.032
Interaction Term (IT) 0.003 0.023 0.019 0.014
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.261 0.113 0.278 0.103
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.153 0.054 -0.173 0.058
Change in UCCt*(IT) 0.010 0.035 0.023 0.042
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.026
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) 0.032 0.043 0.028 0.032
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) -0.068 0.028 -0.052 0.018
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.027 (0.310) 0.102 (0.003)
Change in User Cost -0.063 (0.058) 0.071 (0.080)
Liquidity Ratio 0.139 (0.000) 0.159 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) -0.008 (0.551) -0.018 (0.096)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales 0.022 0.034
Change in User Cost 0.009 0.114
Liquidity Ratio -0.054 0.029
Interaction Term (IT) 0.010 0.040
mean of (IT) 1.055 0.444 1.225
Number of obs. 2,287 2,287 2,287
Wald test 27.11 268.43 187.74
Sargan test 70.29 141.24 136.99
p-value 0.693 0.761 0.834
m1: -7.58 -7.60 -7.11
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 0.90 0.55 0.57
p-value 0.368 0.581 0.566
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 7
Investment Demand with Liquidity Ratio (Equation 6)
Interaction term: share of loans from bank with the largest percentage in total loans
from banks. GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all Large old
It-1/Kt-2 -0.250 0.198 -0.326 0.149 -0.463 0.149
Growth of Salest 0.251 0.146 0.254 0.111 0.446 0.094
Change in UCCt 0.101 0.078 -0.016 0.063 -0.019 0.056
Change in UCCt-1 -0.003 0.038 -0.003 0.035 -0.034 0.035
Liquidity Ratiot 0.131 0.120 0.192 0.079 0.130 0.073
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.019 0.052 0.090 0.037 0.066 0.035
Interaction Term (IT) 0.033 0.098 0.047 0.054 -0.053 0.060
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.468 0.293 0.635 0.231 0.775 0.214
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.302 0.184 -0.395 0.151 -0.537 0.125
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.056 0.064 -0.009 0.065 -0.027 0.060
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.012 0.041 -0.025 0.043 0.029 0.041
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.159 0.134 -0.123 0.090 -0.142 0.089
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.024 0.044 -0.015 0.039 0.003 0.036
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.043 (0.320) -0.025 (0.460) 0.077 (0.014)
Change in User Cost 0.072 (0.365) -0.048 (0.399) -0.056 (0.291)
Liquidity Ratio 0.061 (0.327) 0.209 (0.000) 0.107 (0.001)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.026 (0.746) 0.036 (0.406) -0.036 (0.361)
Small young
It-1/Kt-2 0.185 0.196 0.281 0.189
Growth of Salest -0.382 0.124 -0.777 0.146
Change in UCCt -0.039 0.066 -0.010 0.094
Change in UCCt-1 -0.075 0.046 0.058 0.061
Liquidity Ratiot 0.015 0.072 0.046 0.057
Liquidity Ratiot-1 -0.135 0.046 -0.069 0.036
Interaction Term (IT) 0.053 0.030 0.048 0.028
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) -0.949 0.278 -0.928 0.291
Growth of Salest*(IT) 0.536 0.164 1.132 0.192
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.006 0.090 0.184 0.121
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.091 0.060 0.019 0.088
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.076 0.083 -0.017 0.077
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.148 0.056 0.076 0.048
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.032 (0.069) 0.032 (0.320)
Change in User Cost -0.056 (0.094) 0.105 (0.025)
Liquidity Ratio 0.084 (0.000) 0.092 (0.003)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.088 (0.069) -0.004 (0.934)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales 0.056 -0.045
Change in User Cost -0.008 0.161
Liquidity Ratio -0.125 -0.015
Interaction Term (IT) 0.052 0.032
mean of (IT) 69.90% 84.08% 65.93%
Number of obs. 2,327 2,327 2,327
Wald test 33.54 654.12 335.74
Sargan test 76.35 138.26 140.45
p-value 0.499 0.814 0.776
m1: -8.25 -7.49 -7.75
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 0.97 0.53 0.72
p-value 0.331 0.598 0.469
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 8
Investment Demand with Liquidity Ratio (Equation 6)
Interaction term: share of long term loans from bank with the largest percentage in
long term loans from banks. GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all Large old
It-1/Kt-2 -0.150 0.173 0.017 0.129 -0.225 0.122
Growth of Salest 0.119 0.163 0.278 0.099 0.068 0.090
Change in UCCt 0.054 0.092 -0.061 0.061 0.022 0.055
Change in UCCt-1 -0.004 0.045 0.006 0.038 -0.020 0.037
Liquidity Ratiot 0.094 0.124 0.145 0.083 0.076 0.054
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.015 0.057 0.048 0.039 0.075 0.033
Interaction Term (IT) 0.005 0.084 0.035 0.038 0.023 0.044
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.318 0.251 0.099 0.195 0.450 0.171
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.084 0.200 -0.296 0.134 -0.031 0.109
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.065 0.062 -0.014 0.065 -0.099 0.061
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) -0.009 0.047 -0.055 0.046 -0.007 0.042
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.118 0.138 -0.203 0.086 -0.054 0.068
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.013 0.055 0.036 0.041 -0.055 0.034
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.063 (0.172) 0.069 (0.023) 0.050 (0.096)
Change in User Cost -0.004 (0.971) -0.115 (0.026) -0.084 (0.070)
Liquidity Ratio 0.035 (0.564) 0.079 (0.074) 0.079 (0.002)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.005 (0.951) 0.036 (0.375) 0.019 (0.604)
Small young
It-1/Kt-2 0.022 0.193 0.009 0.190
Growth of Salest -0.416 0.125 -0.092 0.144
Change in UCCt 0.152 0.086 -0.185 0.101
Change in UCCt-1 -0.056 0.068 -0.033 0.057
Liquidity Ratiot 0.128 0.096 0.159 0.053
Liquidity Ratiot-1 -0.141 0.057 -0.038 0.024
Interaction Term (IT) -0.017 0.025 0.082 0.025
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) -0.344 0.264 -0.583 0.275
Growth of Salest*(IT) 0.463 0.158 0.140 0.183
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.200 0.105 0.347 0.126
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.070 0.076 0.124 0.070
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) 0.004 0.104 -0.253 0.069
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.106 0.064 0.061 0.040
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.047 (0.099) 0.037 (0.240)
Change in User Cost -0.104 (0.009) 0.022 (0.555)
Liquidity Ratio 0.131 (0.000) 0.048 (0.088)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.019 (0.500) 0.086 (0.027)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.023 -0.013
Change in User Cost 0.011 0.106
Liquidity Ratio 0.052 -0.031
Interaction Term (IT) -0.017 0.067
mean of (IT) 72.63% 88.18% 68.19%
Number of obs. 2,146 2,146 2,146
Wald test 21.01 565.44 192.78
Sargan test 74.73 135.19 144.4
p-value 0.552 0.860 0.699
m1: -7.93 -7.86 -7.53
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: 1.02 0.65 0.78
p-value 0.307 0.514 0.433
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 9
Investment Demand with Liquidity Ratio (Equation 6)
Interaction term: share of short term loans from bank with the largest percentage in
short term loans from banks. GMM-two step estimators in first differences
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
all Large old
It-1/Kt-2 0.003 0.265 0.070 0.153 -0.214 0.156
Growth of Salest 0.152 0.205 0.273 0.140 0.167 0.126
Change in UCCt 0.019 0.094 -0.013 0.071 0.035 0.068
Change in UCCt-1 0.104 0.069 0.118 0.053 0.078 0.056
Liquidity Ratiot 0.002 0.100 0.065 0.055 0.059 0.050
Liquidity Ratiot-1 0.234 0.050 0.249 0.037 0.165 0.034
Interaction Term (IT) 0.047 0.101 0.030 0.039 -0.057 0.048
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) -0.022 0.334 -0.091 0.200 0.326 0.192
Growth of Salest*(IT) -0.140 0.237 -0.305 0.157 -0.189 0.147
Change in UCCt*(IT) -0.081 0.091 -0.092 0.087 -0.186 0.074
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) -0.114 0.070 -0.157 0.059 -0.104 0.059
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) 0.077 0.106 0.039 0.061 -0.020 0.057
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) -0.074 0.037 -0.077 0.033 -0.029 0.029
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales 0.037 (0.328) 0.023 (0.403) 0.013 (0.603)
Change in User Cost -0.037 (0.629) -0.100 (0.007) -0.133 (0.003)
Liquidity Ratio 0.235 (0.000) 0.281 (0.000) 0.194 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.048 (0.666) 0.032 (0.471) -0.047 (0.195)
Small young
It-1/Kt-2 -0.252 0.138 0.641 0.197
Growth of Salest -0.215 0.153 0.059 0.161
Change in UCCt -0.127 0.098 -0.115 0.152
Change in UCCt-1 -0.234 0.068 0.069 0.075
Liquidity Ratiot 0.076 0.045 -0.186 0.069
Liquidity Ratiot-1 -0.132 0.037 0.149 0.035
Interaction Term (IT) 0.031 0.022 0.056 0.023
It-1/Kt-2*(IT) 0.028 0.179 -1.217 0.263
Growth of Salest*(IT) 0.182 0.174 0.114 0.188
Change in UCCt*(IT) 0.181 0.117 0.238 0.178
Change in UCCt-1*(IT) 0.294 0.076 -0.027 0.089
Liquidity Ratiot*(IT) -0.070 0.052 0.171 0.077
Liquidity Ratiot-1*(IT) 0.061 0.037 -0.157 0.046
Long run elasticity:
1)
Growth of Sales -0.025 (0.050) 0.127 (0.000)
Change in User Cost -0.032 (0.118) -0.002 (0.962)
Liquidity Ratio 0.178 (0.000) 0.124 (0.000)
Interaction Term (IT) 0.052 (0.107) -0.002 (0.978)
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.048 0.114
Change in User Cost 0.068 0.130
Liquidity Ratio -0.104 -0.070
Interaction Term (IT) 0.020 0.045
mean of (IT) 82.05% 88.67% 79.49%
Number of obs. observations 1,705 1,705 1,705
Wald test 39.51 10,176 516.96
Sargan test 78.57 145.47 148.72
p-value 0.429 0.676 0.605
m1: -7.23 -7.08 -7.41
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2: -0.45 -0.49 0.06
p-value 0.650 0.627 0.950
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 years.
Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported. Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of
endogenous and of all predetermined variables
1) evaluated at the mean of the interaction term, number in parenthesis are p-values of χ
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Table 10
Summary Table
Long run elasticities evaluated at different values of interaction term
MIN MEAN MAX MIN MEAN MAX MIN MEAN MAX
Trade credit all all all large Large large old old old
Growth of Sales 0.058 0.053 0.048 0.035 0.052 0.070 0.029 0.024 0.019
Change in User Cost 0.066 0.081 0.097 -0.107 -0.098 -0.088 -0.120 -0.093 -0.065
Liquidity Ratio 0.147 0.156 0.164 0.113 0.163 0.215 0.110 0.138 0.167
small Small small young young young
Growth of Sales -0.007 -0.014 -0.022 0.180 0.156 0.129
Change in User Cost -0.046 -0.055 -0.065 0.093 0.084 0.074
Liquidity Ratio 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.151 0.167 0.185
value of (IT) 27.42% 37.42% 47.42% 34.18% 44.18% 54.18% 25.37% 35.37% 45.37%
Number of banks all all all large Large large old old old
Growth of Sales 0.047 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.064 0.068 0.071
Change in User Cost 0.101 0.101 0.100 -0.075 -0.072 -0.069 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042
Liquidity Ratio 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.188 0.192 0.196 0.124 0.130 0.136
small small small young young young
Growth of Sales 0.034 0.027 0.021 0.111 0.102 0.093
Change in User Cost -0.065 -0.063 -0.061 0.069 0.071 0.074
Liquidity Ratio 0.135 0.139 0.142 0.154 0.159 0.165
value of (IT) 0.955 1.055 1.155 0.344 0.444 0.544 1.125 1.225 1.325
share on total bank
loans
all all all large large large old old old
Growth of Sales 0.072 0.043 0.011 0.019 -0.025 -0.075 0.125 0.077 0.021
Change in User Cost 0.074 0.072 0.071 -0.041 -0.048 -0.056 -0.052 -0.056 -0.061
Liquidity Ratio 0.072 0.061 0.049 0.209 0.209 0.208 0.113 0.107 0.100
small small small young young young
Growth of Sales 0.023 0.032 0.040 -0.016 0.032 0.079
Change in User Cost -0.061 -0.056 -0.052 0.089 0.105 0.119
Liquidity Ratio 0.090 0.084 0.078 0.099 0.092 0.084
value of (IT) 59.90% 69.90% 79.90% 74.08% 84.08% 94.08% 55.93% 65.93% 75.93%
share on long term
bank loans
all all all large large large old old old
Growth of Sales 0.070 0.063 0.056 0.101 0.069 0.037 0.051 0.050 0.049
Change in User Cost 0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.107 -0.115 -0.124 -0.069 -0.084 -0.101
Liquidity Ratio 0.045 0.035 0.025 0.096 0.079 0.061 0.087 0.079 0.071
small small small young young young
Growth of Sales 0.033 0.046 0.059 0.029 0.037 0.045
Change in User Cost -0.089 -0.104 -0.119 -0.006 0.022 0.050
Liquidity Ratio 0.138 0.131 0.124 0.072 0.048 0.024
value of (IT) 62.63% 72.63% 82.63% 78.18% 88.18% 98.18% 58.19% 68.19% 78.19%
share on short term
bank loans
all all all large large large old old old
Growth of Sales 0.051 0.037 0.023 0.054 0.023 -0.008 0.032 0.013 -0.007
Change in User Cost -0.017 -0.037 -0.056 -0.076 -0.100 -0.124 -0.099 -0.133 -0.169
Liquidity Ratio 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.288 0.281 0.275 0.192 0.194 0.195
small small small young young young
Growth of Sales -0.015 -0.025 -0.035 0.143 0.127 0.113
Change in User Cost -0.051 -0.032 -0.014 0.004 -0.002 -0.008
Liquidity Ratio 0.182 0.178 0.173 0.136 0.124 0.113
value of (IT) 72.05% 82.05% 92.05% 78.67% 88.67% 98.67% 69.49% 79.49% 89.49%
NOTE:













































Long run elasticities evaluated at mean of interaction term
no interaction term trade credit
all large old all large old all large old
Growth of Sales 0.266 ** 0.247 ** 0.191 * 0.015 0.020 0.041 0.053 0.052 0.024
Change in User Cost -0.139 -0.219 * -0.333 ** -0.044 -0.094 -0.040 0.081 -0.098 ** -0.093 *
Liquidity Ratio 0.285 ** 0.254 ** 0.224 ** 0.156 ** 0.163 ** 0.138 **
Interaction Term (IT) 0.160 * -0.044 -0.011
small young small young small young
Growth of Sales 0.068 0.298 ** 0.013 0.219 ** -0.014 0.156 **
Change in User Cost -0.156 * 0.047 -0.070 0.122 ** -0.055 0.084 **
Liquidity Ratio 0.122 ** 0.308 ** 0.045 ** 0.167 **
Interaction Term (IT) 0.021 -0.002
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales -0.18 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.18 -0.066 0.132
Change in User Cost 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.043 0.177
Liquidity Ratio -0.29 -0.13 0.08 -0.118 0.030
Interaction Term (IT) 0.064 0.008
number of banks share on total bank loans share on long term bank loans share on short term bank loans
all large old all large old all large old all large old
Growth of Sales 0.048 0.006 0.068 ** 0.043 -0.025 0.077 ** 0.063 0.069 ** 0.050 * 0.037 0.023 0.013
Change in User Cost 0.101 -0.072 -0.042 0.072 -0.048 -0.056 -0.004 -0.115 ** -0.084 * -0.037 -0.100 ** -0.133 **
Liquidity Ratio 0.165 ** 0.192 ** 0.130 ** 0.061 0.209 ** 0.107 ** 0.035 0.079 * 0.079 ** 0.235 ** 0.281 ** 0.194 **
Interaction Term (IT) -0.026 -0.018 -0.057 ** 0.026 0.036 -0.036 0.005 0.036 0.019 0.048 0.032 -0.047
small young small young small young small young
Growth of Sales 0.027 0.102 ** 0.032 * 0.032 0.047 * 0.037 -0.025 * 0.127 **
Change in User Cost -0.063 * 0.071 * -0.056 * 0.105 ** -0.104 ** 0.022 -0.032 -0.002
Liquidity Ratio 0.139 ** 0.159 ** 0.084 ** 0.092 ** 0.131 ** 0.048 * 0.178 ** 0.124 **
Interaction Term (IT) -0.008 -0.018 * 0.088 * -0.004 0.019 0.086 ** 0.052 -0.002
Long run differential coefficient
Growth of Sales 0.022 0.034 0.056 -0.045 -0.023 -0.013 -0.048 0.114
Change in User Cost 0.009 0.114 -0.008 0.161 0.011 0.106 0.068 0.130
Liquidity Ratio -0.054 0.029 -0.125 -0.015 0.052 -0.031 -0.104 -0.070
Interaction Term (IT) 0.010 0.040 0.052 0.032 -0.017 0.067 0.020 0.045
NOTE: Small firms: firms with less than employees 55, young firms: firms established in the last 10 yearsECB • Working Paper No 108 • December 2001 39
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